physiognomy. 3 The anthropologist Franz Boas, a German-Jewish émigré to the USA, who had studied with the ethnologist Adolf Bastian at the University of Berlin, was an intimate expert on Völkerpsychologie. In a famous essay on the history of anthropology, which served as a manifesto to his approach to cultural anthropology, he referred to "Völkerpsychologie" as a major influence for linguistic-anthropological studies and specifically mentioned Steinthal's works. 4 As a true synthesis of the disciplines that studied "man", Boasian cultural anthropology practised a combination of physical anthropology, ethnology, linguistics and psychology that included perspectives of Lazarus and Steinthal's Völkerpsychologie, but went far beyond its scope. His British "counterpart" Bronislaw Malinowski had a similar trajectory. Before he established himself in British academia, he had studied with Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, where he had started working on a PhD in
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French academia. The pioneers of the French social sciences, however, closely observed their German counterparts, and in the process appropriated and reworked central perspectives and concepts they found in German Völkerpsychologie, which were thus included in seminal works of the early social sciences which have acquired the status of "classical" texts. Some of the best-known French academics and intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century -Théodule Ribot, Célestin Bouglé, Ernest Renan, Alfred Fouillée, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss --commented extensively on Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, and developped their versions of a "social science" that would reach beyond traditional philosophy, philology and history in a close dialogue with Völkerpsychologie. 8 After outlining the main tenets of German Völkerpsychologie, I will reconstruct this French reception of Völkerpsychologie and argue that it constituted a significant but neglected process of cultural transfer between Germany and France. The French reception and appropriation of Völkerpsychologie is crucial to an understanding of the deeply entangled intellectual relations between the two neighbouring countries around the turn of the century. 9 Furthermore, it forces us to rethink the formative period of the social sciences: far from being an oddity that can be confined to a German intellectual Sonderweg, Völkerpsychologie was an integral part of these wideranging debates. believed in national progress as much as in the assumption of a harmonic plurality of the different nations that constituted mankind. In contrast to earlier attempts to conceptualize "national character" from Montesquieu to John Stuart Mill, however, their aim was to build a comprehensive discipline that was exclusively devoted to the study of the "folk spirit" (Volksgeist). Lazarus and Steinthal's Völkerpsychologie provided an amalgam of the philosophies Joseph Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 -1835 and Georg W. F. Hegel (1770 Hegel ( -1831 and aimed at an alternative to both historicism and philosophical idealism. Their contributions to "Völkerpsychologie" kept much of the romantic terminology of the early nineteenth century, most importantly the concept of the Volksgeist, as well as an uncritical belief in the Volk as the source of everything that was good, true, and beautiful. For Lazarus and Steinthal, the "folk spirit" was not only an important aspect of history, but the driving force of any historical development. Hence they declared the discovering of the "laws of the development of the folk spirit" the main purpose of A discipline that focused on the study of man as a social being was overdue, they argued, since psychology had thus far remained incomplete and structurally flawed by concentrating on the individual mind. Man, however, was "by birth a member of a Volk, and is thus determined in his mental development in manifold ways". The "folk", to which man belonged by nature, represented more than the sum of its parts, Lazarus and Steinthal were convinced. 12 The individual could not be adequately understood "without regard to the mental whole (die geistige Gesamtheit) in which it has been created and in which it lives". 13 One of the main tasks of Völkerpsychologie, then, was to clarify the interaction (Wechselwirkung) between the individual and the community. Lazarus and Steinthal understood this relation as an asymmetric one, since the "mental activity" of an individual was always rooted in the "spirit" of the folk. The community regularly took precedence over the individual.
Individual achievements could only be understood and explained as products of the folk spirit, even though they were "expressed" by individuals. Language was the prime example to illustrate this point: it was never "invented" or "created" by an individual, but as a means of communication presupposed the existence of a folk community. For civilized nations (Kulturvölker), language was the most natural medium to express their peculiarities; it was passed on from generation to generation and perfected in the process. Equally customs, works of art, and the general culture of a folk were products of a "slow and incremental progressive development", but not 12 Lazarus and Steinthal, "Einleitende Gedanken", H. Steinthal, Grammatik, Logik, und Psychologie, ihre Prinzipien und ihr Verhältnis zueinander (Berlin, 1855), 388. creations of an individual. 14 Each Volk thus developed its own "objective spirit" which existed independently of the individual "subjective spirit". This "folk spirit" turned the multitude of individuals into a coherent people since it functioned as the "bond, the principle, and the idea of a people" through which a nation acquired its unity and became a harmonic, organic entity. 15 Lazarus and Steinthal thus presented the separation of humanity into Völker or nations as the natural form of existence. To them, differences between "peoples" were not primarily a cause for conflicts, but rather the precondition for the "development of mankind". The diversity and pluralism of nations, Lazarus and Steinthal argued, needed to be welcomed and encouraged since it allowed for the advancement of humanity and culture. The approach of Völkerpsychologie itself, they believed, would show how the "diversity of peoples" contributed to the "development of the human spirit". 16 Lazarus and Steinthal's Völkerpsychologie epitomized the mentality of nineteenth century liberals with its belief in science, progress, and the nation; these convictions were re-enforced by their experience of Jewish emancipation. While their support of the national movement in Germany represented the conventional wisdom of middle-class intellectuals, they introduced a notion of the "folk" that showed an exceptional level of reflection and analysis. Even though they considered language as 14 Lazarus, Steinthal, "Einleitende Gedanken", 31; M. Lazarus, "Verdichtung des Denkens in der Geschichte", in ZfVS 2 (1862), 54-62, at 57; M. Lazarus, "Über das Verhältnis des Einzelnen zur Geamtheit", in ZfVS 2 (1862), 393-453; see B. Weiler,
Die Ordnung des Fortschritts: Zum Aufstieg und Fall der Fortschrittsidee der
'jungen' Anthropologie (Bielefeld, 2006), 183-90. the most important common trait of a Volk, they found it insufficient to define it by language alone, since some languages were used by more than one nation (notably German and English), while other nations, such as Switzerland, used more than one language. Common descent or kinship could not define a nation either, Lazarus and Steinthal argued, since all nations were ethnically mixed. A neat "objective" definition of the nation or the "folk" was hard to come by. As a consequence, they introduced a subjective or voluntaristic notion of the Volk: Its existence and reality depended on the will of its members to become a folk and belong to it. The "folk" or nation was the result of a conscious and deliberate decision of its members; it depended on the realization of its members of their common "folk spirit". The Volk was the "first product of the folk spirit". Therefore, its "character" was flexible and changeable, and it needed to be re-created permanently. 17 Wilhelm Wundt, best known as the "founding father" of modern, scientific psychology, was also the scholar most closely associated with the concept of processes of the mind. These could be studied with experimental methods, which he had "borrowed" from physiology and introduced to psychological research. This "scientific" approach to psychology, practised in psychological "laboratories", established his fame and reputation and secured him his place in the annals of the discipline. 19 Experimental methods were, however, only of limited use for psychologists, Wundt argued, since they could only be applied to the study of the most basic functions of the mind such as reactions, perceptions, and sensations. The more complex, higher "products" of the mind asked for a different approach since they could not be recreated in the set-up of a laboratory, but only observed indirectly: 11 (1975), 287-97; G. Lamberti, Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832 -1920 : Leben, Werk und Persönlichkeit in Bildern und Texten (Bonn, 1995 14 the traditional moral philosophy. 23 He agreed that any study of ethics had to build on "folk-psychological" knowledge and described Völkerpsychologie as the "portico" (Vorhalle) of ethics. 24 The clearest and most concise summary of Wundt's concept of Völkerpsychologie can be found in the introduction to his single volume Elements of Folk Psychology, published in 1912. 25 In contrast to the multi-volume long version of Völkerpsychologie which analysed the appearances of the "folk soul", i.e. language, myth and religion, and customs separately, the one-volume digest provided a chronologically organized history of mankind (or civilization). Wundt argued that such a comprehensive summary was the real aim of his Völkerpsychologie, thus stressing its teleological character. "Development" was the main organizing principle of his approach, and Wundt put forward a number of bold theses about the "origins" of social practices and institutions. Similar to the development of the individual from childhood to adolescence to adulthood, peoples developed in clearly defined stages, he argued. The first stage in this Völkerentwicklung was the primitive age, which formed the "lowest level of culture". 26 The primitive age was followed by the totemistic age, defined as a state of mind where, in contrast to modern times, the "animal ruled over the human being". The next step in the development of mankind was the age of "heroes and gods"; it was defined by the emergence and rule of individuals and the military (kriegerische) organization of the "tribal community", which in turn led to the emergence of the state. The "age of heroes and gods" also witnessed the emergence of national religions; epic tales replaced the myths and fairy tales of earlier times. The fourth stage of the development of mankind was characterized by the predominance of the national state and national religions, which still dominated the present time. The future development of civilization, however, would overcome national divisions and lead to "humanity", a truly universal worldcivilization.
III.
The outline of a comprehensive Völkerpsychologie as suggested by Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt included serious conceptual flaws and errors, and contemporary critics did not hesitate to expose these. 27 But even the reaction of outspoken critics and was one of the main opponents of traditional philosophical "spiritualism". Inspired by both English and German psychology, Ribot was a champion of experimental psychology and instrumental in introducing "scientific" methods to French philosophy. He admired and translated the works of Herbert Spencer, wrote a major study on "psychological heredity" inspired by Charles Darwin and Francis Galton, but was best known for his studies on amnesia and the "diseases of memory". 30 A student Völkerpsychologie", in Idem, Probleme der Völkerpsychologie, (Leipzig, 1911 [1886 It also included a chapter on the "Herbart-school" in which he commended the plans for a Völkerpsychologie as outlined by Lazarus and Steinthal. 32 As the main representatives of this "Herbart-school" in Germany he presented the anthropologist were based on the assumption of an Allgeist or general spirit that functioned as the "precondition and bond of every society and as the foundation of moral life". This notion showed Steinthal's "metaphysical tendencies", Ribot opined. 34 Lazarus's main academic work, his collected essays on the "Life of the Soul", were more the work of a "moraliste" than of a psychologist, according to Ribot. It contained fine observations on "humor" as a psychological phenomenon, and on "tact", "honour" and "glory". But Lazarus resembled more the poets and romanciers on which he had relied for his studies than a serious scholar since he did not possess the "rigorous scientific method" that was necessary to classify facts and establish "scientific laws". 35 Still, Lazarus and Steinthal's "project" for a future Völkerpsychologie, as laid down in the programmatic articles published in the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, found Ribot's support. He fully agreed with their view that the "people" represented more than the sum of its parts, and that a specialized psychological discipline was necessary to complement individual psychology: "Next to general psychology which studies the individual, there is space for another discipline devoted to the study of man as a social being, or more precisely, the many groups human beings belong to: this discipline is ethnological psychology." 36 To make the case for such a discipline, it was necessary to show that individual psychology was an insufficient approach. Adopting the core idea of "mass psychology", Ribot argued that this task could easily be achieved: as soon as people became part of a crowd or large group, they changed their behaviour and developed represented the average of a nation; one had to ignore children, "idiots" and "retarded people" as well as outstanding geniuses to study the "objective spirit", as represented by the remaining average. 38 Lazarus and Steinthal had clearly defined the elements which constituted the Volksgeist and would form the object of study of the new discipline: Next to language they listed myths, religion, customs, poetry, writing, art, but also practical life, mores, professions, family life, and the many reciprocal relations between these manifestations of the objective spirit. They had thus outlined a proper "scientific" history which could follow the model of the natural sciences and promised to elevate the study of history to the rank of a proper scientific discipline: "The laws of biography, i.e. the development of individual spirits, have to be established by the psychology of the individual; in the same way, the laws of history, which could be called the biography of nations, have to be established by comparative psychology which will thus constitute a truly scientific history." 39 Still, Ribot was well aware of the shortcomings of Lazarus and Steinthal's grandiose plans.
Despite outlining a neat programme of study, and despite the twenty years of its existence, their journal had not fulfilled its promises. It had provided a number of useful materials and documents, but no precise results and no general conclusions. students, the teacher Alfred Leicht who was in charge of editing his autobiographical writings and tried to preserve the image of his teacher for posterity, even accused Renan of plagiarism because he had not referenced Lazarus's text. 43 It is certainly possible that Renan, a scholar who was very familiar with German philosophy, arts and letters, found much inspiration in Lazarus's text. Steinthal had known Renan personally since his time in Paris, and had published a very critical review of his work on the "character of the semitic peoples" in the first volume of the ZfVS. Lazarus had met Renan occasionally, too. 44 Despite this dispute, the similarities between both texts are striking: similar to Lazarus, Renan dismissed attempts to define a nation by "objective" criteria such as language, territory and race as insufficient. All these "objective" factors played a part in the formation of nations and had to be considered by historians and philosophers, Renan argued, but they could not alone explain the characteristics of a nation. Renan argued that the "national spirit" depended as much on common memory as on forgetting, an idea that recalls Nietzsche's "monumental history". To create a strong and powerful national spirit, Renan claimed, it was not only necessary to accumulate knowledge, but also to cast aside the memory national defeats. Importantly, Renan argued that the existence of a nation could not be taken for granted. Rather, it had to be re-enacted perpetually, a mechanism for which he coined the catch-phrase of the nation as a "daily plebiscite". In complete agreement with Lazarus, Renan argued that the nation ultimately rested on the will of its 24 members to form a nation; it was "socially constructed". Furthermore, both Lazarus's and Renan's texts were directed at the same opponents, i.e. German-Prussian nationalists such as von Treitschke whose aim was "complete" the political unification of Germany and therfore targeted the alleged "enemies" of the German nation: Catholics, Socialists, and Jews. Lazarus, however, had employed the idea of the nation as a product of the will of its members to defend the rights of the German Jews as full members of the German nation. Renan, in contrast, used the same idea to argue against the claims of German nationalists to the annexed regions of Alsace and Lorraine as "naturally" German provinces. 45 Within the emerging "Durkheim school" of sociology, German Völkerpsychologie. According to Fouillée, the national spirit was not only an effect, but also a cause, and it was not only defined by individuals, but defined them as well. 53 Like Ribot before him, Fouillée also referred to the results of mass psychology as an aid for Völkerpsychologie. Gabriel Tarde (1843 -1904 ), Scipio Sighele (1868 -1913 , and Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), had shown, he argued, that as part of a group, the individual changed his character; hence large groups, and certainly nations, could not simply be treated as an addition of individuals. Every nation, Fouillée maintained, had its own unique consciousness and its own will, but the reigning individualism in the study of politics, economics, psychology and ethics had obscured this simple fact. Just like every individual was characterized by a set of idées-forces, every nation had a similar set of guiding ideas. 54 Fouillée's main target, however, were not the "individualists" who had ignored the importance of society and the nation, but the craniologists and phrenologists who tried to explain the differences between nations by studying the average form of skulls or the weight of brains. He referred to the jurist and sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838 Gumplowicz ( -1909 and Gustave Le Bon as representatives of such an approach; his main opponent, however, was the count Georges Vacher de Lapouge , an outspoken racial antisemite and follower of the "Aryan myth". 55 To counter the ideas of scientific racism, which had become increasingly popular by the end of the nineteenth century, Fouillée employed a paraphrase of Lazarus's definition of the nation. A nation could never be defined exclusively by physiological, ethnographic, or economic factors. Rather, "national individuality" manifested itself through psychological forces, namely language, religion, literature and art, buildings, and the image a nation held of itself and of others. Therefore, Fouillée pleaded for a middling position between "idealists" and "materialists": He conceded that biological factors played a part in constituting a nation, but could never exhaustively explain its peculiarities. As the three "major causes" that formed a nation, he identified its "constitution", "temperament" and "mental character". 56 In contrast to Lazarus and Steinthal, then, Fouillée put more emphasis on biological factors in defining a nation, but he ultimately and emphatically agreed with their "voluntaristic" definition of the folk spirit. 57 The "essence" of a nation was to be found in its "conscience", not in physical traits. Despite Fouillée's effort in outlining a balanced approach to Wilhelm Wundt had started publishing his Völkerpsychologie at a time when the social sciences, and particularly sociology, were slowly emerging as distinct disciplines, after decades of latency. He had clearly distinguished Völkerpsychologie from sociology, and one of the reasons he stubbornly stuck to the much debated term Völkerpsychologie over "social psychology" or "sociology" was the "presentist" outlook of the latter. The champions of sociology, in turn, could not ignore Wundt's Völkerpsychologie since it too obviously overlapped with their own efforts to study "society" as a whole. Many sympathetic critics of Wundt argued that he had really S. Lukes, Emile Durkheim, his Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study (London, 1992), 86-98. experimental psychology 60 -Durkheim was particularly impressed by Wundt's antimetaphysical approach to moral philosophy. His report on the "moral sciences" was in fact an extended review of Wundt's Ethics, which he compared to the works of the "socialists of the chair" (Kathedersozialisten), namely Adolph Wagner and Gustav Schmoller (1838 Schmoller ( -1917 , as well as Albert Schäffle (1831 Schäffle ( -1903 and the philosopher of law Rudolf Jhering. As Durkheim explained, in contrast to the "Manchester"-school of political economy all these scholars agreed that "society" was not simply a collection of individuals, but constituted an object of its own. Secondly, they had demonstrated that morality as well as the law were not intellectual abstractions, but empirical facts that had to be studied as such. 61 Durkheim confirmed that Wundt's method was "purely empirical" (nettement empirique). He strongly agreed with him that "collective phenomena" such as morality and religion had to be studied empirically, and that social psychology (as Durkheim's translation of Völkerpsychologie) would provide the relevant material to do so. It was a common mistake to view the individual as the "principal motor" of social life whereas "collective facts" such as ethics and religion originated in other social facts. 62 According to Durkheim, Wundt's study was outstanding for mainly two reasons: first, it was rigorously based on facts and avoided abstract or normativist speculations, and 60 Ribot, La Psychologie allemande contemporaine, 215-297. 61 E. Durkheim, "La science positive de la morale en Allemagne" Revue philosophique de la France a de l'étranger 12 (1887), 33-58, 113-142, 275-284, at37 : 'Il est faux de dire qu'un tout soit égal à la somme de ses parties.' The second part of this essay was completely devoted to Wundt's Ethics.
62
Durkheim, "La science positive de la morale ", 113, 116, 118-119. second, it showed that morality had "evolved" according to laws that science was to determine. 63 In his later career, Durkheim played down the inspiration he received from Wundt, and German scholarship in general, mainly because he was keen to be seen as a truly original scholar, but also because he was accused of having lifted the main elements of his sociology from German authors. In 1907, the Belgian Catholic writer Simon Deploige attacked Durkheim directly and argued that his sociology was not French in origin, as Durkheim had proudly claimed, but nothing but a paraphrase of German ideas. All of Durkheim's "main ideas were basically German in origin", Deploige stated, and therefore alien to French thinking. 64 His denunciation was part of a general polemic against Durkheim's school and the Nouvelle Sorbonne which constituted, in Wolf Lepenies's words, a "rear battle of the Dreyfus affair". The defamation of Durkheim's sociology as "German" and foreign thus included a barely disguised anti-Semitic accusation. 65 To his defence, while conceding that he had learned much from German philosophy and social science, Durkheim insisted on the originality and "Frenchness" of his approach, and played down German influences on his sociology. Still, and despite his reputation as a harsh and ruthless reviewer, 63 Durkheim, "La science positive de la morale", 138. The fact that Wundt insisted on the name Völkerpsychologie instead of "social psychology" did not convince Durkheim. Wundt's dismissal of sociology as a limited and "presentist" approach revealed an odd understanding the discipline; thus far, Durkheim explained, his own contributions to sociology had been criticized not for an exaggerated concern with the present, but for their focus on ancient and primitive forms of civilization. 68 Wundt was not able to account for the sudden appearance of the "individual" during the age of "heroes and gods". Most importantly, Wundt's argument rested on assumptions of the philosophy of history which presupposed that mankind developed in a steady, uni-linear way towards a clear goal, "humanity". Oddly in a study of Völkerpsychologie, Wundt had ignored national differences in his effort to present the history of mankind as one integrated process. In contrast, Durkheim explained, the history of civilization had to be compared to a tree with many related, but different branches. In sum, Durkheim concluded, Wundt's study was too ambitious and had forced him to employ simplifying concepts. Despite these serious objections to Wundt's study, however, he still found much to praise in it. Arguably, it was impossible for any individual scholar to answer all the questions that Völkerpsychologie raised. Wundt had done the best that was possible for an individual scholar, and whatever the "objective value" of his synthesis, it demanded the respect of the reader. 69 When Marcel Mauss (1872 Mauss ( -1950 ), Durkheim's nephew and close collaborator, reviewed the volumes of Wundt's ten-volume Völkerpsychologie devoted to his own specialism, myth and religion, for Ribot's Revue philosophique, he came to similar conclusions: As "one of the last encyclopaedic minds in Germany", Mauss wrote, Wundt's work showed "the usual flaws of the philosopher -excessive systematization, hasty generalization, multiplied and complicated divisions". But even specialists could profit from his work since he tried to clarify facts and define concepts that were frequently used, but often overlooked. 70 Mauss praised Wundt's study of the development of art, especially his context. Followed by the collapse of the "second empire", the civil war of the commune and the establishing of the Third Republic, this defeat caused a period of intensive soul-searching on the French part, and convinced many that the military defeat was due to the superior system of higher education in Germany, especially in Prussia. 78 A number of French scholars and academics went on pilgrimages to German universities to study and learn from their alleged superiority, which led to a wave of intellectual transfers across the Rhine. The appropriation of Völkerpsychologie in France was part of this movement, and it remained a one-sided affair. Völkerpsychologie was most appealing to scholars who were trying to establish a proper science of the "social" that would go beyond that stale "individualism" then dominant in French departments of philosophy, and thus make a contribution to the study of contemporary, modern society. The Germans, it seemed to French observers, were well advanced in this regard. And while there was no lack of home-grown French attempts at formulating a social psychology in the guise of mass or crowd psychology, equally considered as one of the "precursors" of modern social psychology, German Völkerpsychologie offered French social scientists a welcome alternative to this approach, which was most successfully represented by Gustave Le Bon. Based on an elitist, anti-democratic outlook, Le Bon was generally suspicious of the importance the "crowd" had achieved in the modern age. He compared the behaviour of the foule to that of women, savages and children, who were all deemed incapable of rational thinking. Crowd psychology, then, was a barely disguised defence strategy of the rational, male individual against the onslaught of the democratic age that promised to emancipate previously excluded groups. As such, it had little in common with Völkerpsychologie, which was based on a positive, even 78 C. Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française (Paris, 1959) . 
